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United Structures v. G.R.G. Engineering: Set-off
v. Recoupment in Miller Act Payment Bond
Disputes
Since 1935, the Miller Act1 has served to protect suppliers
on federal construction projects. The Act provides a statutory
scheme for payment and performance bonds in connection with
federal jobs. The performance bond portion of the Miller Act
protects the federal government by ensuring that money will be
available should the project remain un~ompleted.~
The payment bond provisions on the other hand ensure compensation
to "any person who has . . . furnished labor or material and
who has not been paid in full" by a general contractor or subc o n t r a ~ t o r .Disputes
~
often arise between general contractors
and those protected by its payment bond. This note concerns
the payment bond portion of the Miller Act and the rights retained by a general contractor supplied with defective materials
or labor.
The Miller Act is highly remedial and is subject to a liberal
interpretation for the protection of those it shelter^.^ These aspects of the Act clash with other objectives stated by the Su.~
preme C o ~ r t Thus,
courts must balance general principles
when faced with a n unpaid materialmans in a dispute with a
general contractor who claims the supplied materials are defective. In the realm of counterclaims, for example, the Supreme
Court wishes "to prevent multiplicity of actions and to achieve

1. 40 U.S.C. $$ 270a-270d (1988). Before the Miller Act, the Heard Act of
1894, ch. 280, 28 Stat. 278 (codified as amended a t 40 U.S.C. § 270 (1934)), repealed by Miller Act, ch. 642, 49 Stat. 794 (1935), served the same function by
"requir[ing] Government contractors to execute penal bonds for t h e benefit of 'all
persons supplying him or them with labor and materials in the prosecution of the
work provided for in such contract.'" Clifford F. MacEvoy Co. v. United States ex
rel. Calvin Tomkins Co., 322 U.S. 102, 104 (1944) (citing the Heard Act).
2. See infra note 15 and accompanying text.
3. F.D. Rich Co. v. United States ex rel. Indus. Lumber Co., 417 U S . 116,
118 (1974).
4. MacEuoy, 322 U.S. a t 107.
5. F.D.Rich, 417 U.S. a t 124 (citing MacEuoy, 322 U.S. a t 107).
6. Or another sub or sub-subcontrador. See infra notes 24-29 and accompanying text.
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resolution in a single lawsuit of all disputes arising out of common matters.'" However, "the intent [of the Miller Act] was to
remove procedural difficulties . . . and thereby make it easier
for unpaid creditors to realize the benefits of the [payment]
bond.'" In this manner, the purpose of protecting sheltered
parties can a t times oppose the goal of preventing unnecessary
duplication of actions. Two recent cases, decided i n Federal
Circuits on opposite sides of the country arrive on opposite
sides of the issue by giving weight to different stated object i v e ~This
. ~ note will consider both sides of the issue, ultimately siding with those who would give the Miller Act its full remedial powers despite other stated goals of streamlined litigation.

A. The Miller Act
The Miller Act1' was enacted in 1935 as a replacement for
the Heard Act of 1894." It requires contractors to furnish
both a performance and a payment bond12 to the federal government13 "[blefore any contract, exceeding $25,000 i n
amount, for the construction, alteration, or repair of any public
building o r public work of the United States"14 is awarded.
The purpose of the performance bond is to protect the United
States Government by ensuring that the work is completed.15

7. Southern Constr. Co. v. Pickard, 371 U.S. 57, 60 (1962).
8. MacEvoy, 322 U.S. at 106 (discussing the Miller Act's intent to improve
upon the Heard Act).
9. See United Structures of America v. G.R.G. Eng'g, S.E., 9 F.3d 996 (1st
Cir. 1993); United States ex rel. Martin Steel Constructors, Inc. v. Avanti Constructors, Inc., 750 F.2d 759 (9th Cir. 1984).
lo. 40 U.S.C. 9s 270a-270d.
11. MacEuoy, 322 U.S. at 105; H.R. REP. NO. 1263, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., a t
1 (1935). The Heard Act is found at Ch. 280, 28 Stat. 278 (codified as amended at
40 U.S.C. § 270 (1934)), repealed by Miller Act, Ch. 642, 49 Stat. 794 (1935).
12. This represents an improvement on the Heard Act, which required the
general contractor to post "but one bond . . . which serve[d] as protection both for
the United States and for subcontractors, material men, and laborers." H.R. REP.
NO. 1263, at 2 (1935). "If suit [was] brought by the United States on the bond,
other claimants may [have] intervene[d] and ha(d] their claims adjudicated, subject
t o the priority of the United States." Id.
13. Note that under the Miller Act, "[t]ypically, the performance bond and the
payment bond are two separate instruments." ROBERTRUBIN ET AL., CONSTRUCTION
AND RESOLUTION
129 (1992).
CLAIMS PREVENTION
14. 40 U.S.C. 9 270a.
15. United States a rel. Warren v. Kimrey, 489 F.2d 339, 342 (8th Cir. 1974)
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The payment bond, on the other hand, "protect[s] those who
furnish labor and material to prime contractor^."'^ For example, in the case of an insolvent general contractor, the government could collect on the performance bond, thus "ensur[ing]
that [it] will receive a completed project a t the price set forth in
the underlying contract."17 Likewise, under the payment bond,
those serving the general contractor could sue for recompense.''
As mentioned above, this note concerns the payment rather
than the performance bond portion of the Act. The language of
the Miller Act's payment bond provisions protects suppliers to
government contractsl%ho furnish "labor or material in the
prosecution of the work [and] who ha[ve] not been paid in
full . . . sums justly due [them].'"' Because state-based
mechanics' liens cannot attach to government property,21
these suppliers are "deprived of their usual security interest,"
absent the protection of the Act.= Despite a n avowedly liberal
the Act's
interpretation on the part of the federal
remedies are limited to those who have a contractual agreement with either the general contractor or a s u b c ~ n t r a c t o r . ~ ~
Thus, Congress has mandated that "[a] sub-subcontractor may
avail himself of the protection of the bond . . . but that is as far
as the bill goes. It is not felt that more remote relationships
ought to come within the purview of the bond."25
The United States Supreme Court has defined a subcontractor as "one who contracts with a prime c ~ n t r a c t o r . "Only
~~
--

("[Tlhe performance bond . . . under the terms of [40 U.S.C.] 8 270a is for the
protection of the United States."); Vardaman S. DUM, Construction Contract
Claims and Litigation-Suits
on Public Bonds and Suits on Private Bonds, 55
MISS. L.J. 431, 437 (1985).
16. 17 AM. JLJR.2D Contractor's Bonds 5 150 (1990) (footnote omitted).
17. Anthony N. Palladino & Anna P. Clarke, The Recognition of Sureties'
Rights Under Government Contracts, 25 TORT& INS. L.J. 637, 645 (1990).
18. Id.
19. Clifford F. MacEvoy Co. v. United States ex rel. Calvin Tomkins Co., 322
U.S. 102, 107 (1944).
20. 40 U.S.C. 8 270b(a) (1988).
21. United States v. Munsey Trust Co., 332 U.S. 234, 241 (1947) (citations
omitted); F.D. Rich Co. v. Indus. Lumber Co., 417 U.S. 116, 122 (1973).
22. F.D.Rich, 417 U.S. a t 122.
23. See infra notes 110-115 and accompanying text.
24. Clifford F. MacEvoy Co. v. United States ex re1 Calvin Tomkins Co., 322
U S . 102, 107-08 (1944).
25. REP. NO. 1263, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., at 3 (1935); S. REP. NO. 1238, 74th
Cong., 1st Sess., a t 2 (1935).
26. J.W. Bateson Co. v. United States ex rel. Bd. of Trustees, 434 U.S. 586,
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those in privity with a contractor or subcontractor are afforded
the protection of the Miller ~ c t . Employees
~'
or those supplying materials to sub-subcontractors cannot take advantage of
it.28This result is contrary to the plain language of the Act,
which protects "[elvery person who has furnished labor or material i n prosecution of the
The Court apparently assumed "that Congress did not intend to impose such a burden
without explicit language being used to this effect."30 This
preference for bright line tests i n Miller Act disputes was embraced by the Ninth Circuit i n United States u. Avanti Constructors, Inc. 31

B. United States ex rel. Martin Steel Constructors, Inc. v.
Avanti Constructors, Inc.
I n United States ex rel. Martin Steel Constructors, Inc. u.
Auanti Constructors, Inc.," the Ninth Circuit dealt with t h e
issue of whether a general contractor has the right of set-off
against a supplier in a Miller Act payment bond dispute.33
Specifically, Avanti concerned a supplier not in privity with t h e
general contractor." There, Martin Steel Constructors, Inc.
("Martin") supplied steel to Harvis Construction, Inc. ("Harvis")
a n d subsequently sued Harvis on its Miller Act Payment Bond
for monies allegedly due.35 Avanti Constructors, Inc.
("Avanti") was a subcontractor of Harvis with whom Martin
h a d c o n t r a ~ t e d As
. ~ ~a defense to Martin's action, Harvis con-

594 (1978).
27. Id.
28. Id. at 593. This line drawing inspired a fierce dissent from Justice
Stevens, who was joined by Justice Brennan. They felt that the legislative intent of
the Heard Act, as gleaned from the floor debates, mandated a liberal interpretation
such that "the . . . Act cover[] 'all persons supplying [ a contractor or contractors]
labor and materials in the prosecution of the work . . . .'" Id. a t 596 (quoting ch.
280, 28 Stat. 278 (as amended at 40 U.S.C. § 270 (1926))).
29. 40 U.S.C. § 270b(a) (emphasis added).
30. DUM, supra note 15, at 443 (footnote omitted). "The reason[] relates to
the practical difficulty that would be encountered by the prime contractor in protecting himself against claims of remote material suppliers with whom he has no
contractual relationship." Id. at 442-43.
31. 750 F.2d 759 (9th Cir. 1984).
32. Id.
33. Id. at 762.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 760.
36. Avanti went bankrupt in May of 1982 and was subsequently dismissed as
a party to the suit. Id.
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tended that it was entitled to a set-off because Martin's steel
was "late and d e f e ~ t i v e . " ~ ~
The Ninth Circuit rejected this argument, holding that "a
set-off defense is not available in a Miller Act claim in the
absence of p r i ~ i t y . "It~ ~reasoned that a set-off defense would
"unduly burden the enforcement of the rights created under the
act."3g Further, the court concluded that any claims Harvis
had for the defective steel were against Avanti, not Martin.40
The court justified this by reasoning t h a t "the prime contractor
selects his own subcontractors and it seems not unjustly harsh
that he should be holden for their laxities.'"' Finally, the
court cited several cases4"o
support its assertion that the
right of set-off is allowed only where "the plaintiff is a subcontractor or materialman of the general contractor and thus is in
direct contractual relations with the c ~ u n t e r c l a i m a n t . " ~ ~
By allowing Avanti, a sub-subcontractor, to categorically
recover on the bond, the court gave effect to the general aim of
the Miller Act: "[Tlo protect those whose labor or material has
contributed to the prosecution of the
Nine years later,
the issue was revisited i n United Structures of America v.
G.R.G. Engineering, S . E . There,
~~
under similar facts, another
Federal Circuit Court of Appeals on the opposite side of the
country came to a contrary conclusion.

37. Id. at 762.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 763.
41. Id. (quoting Glassel-Taylor Co. v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 153 F.2d 527,
530-31 (5th Cir. 1946)).
42. United States ex rd. Johnson v. Morley Constr. Co., 98 F.2d 781, 790 (2d
Cir. 1938); United States ex rel. Kashulines v. Thermo Contracting Corp., 437 F.
Supp. 195 (D.N.J. 1976); United States ex reJ. Arlmont Air Condition Corp. v. Premier Contractors, Inc., 283 F. Supp. 343, 348-49 (N.D.Me. 1968).
43. Avanti, 750 F.2d at 762.
44. United States ex rel. Hill v. American Sur. Co., 200 U.S. 197, 204 (1906);
see also DUM, supra note 15, at 437-38 (''[Tlhe Act is highly remedial and entitled
to liberal construction and application in order properly to effectuate the congressional intent to protect suppliers of labor and materials for public projects."
(footnote omitted)).
45. 9 F.3d 996 (1st Cir. 1993).
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111. UNITED
STRUCTURES
OF AMERICA
V. G.R.G.
ENGINEERING,
S.E.

A. The Facts
In United Structures of America u. G.R.G. Engineering,
S.E.,46 the First Circuit dealt with a fact pattern similar to
t h a t in Avanti. G.R.G. Engineering ("G.R.G.") was the general
contractor on two projects: one for the United States Government and one for the Puerto Rican G~vernment.~'
Regarding
the United States Government project, G.R.G. was required to
furnish a payment bond pursuant to the Miller Act "'for the
protection of all persons supplying labor and material' to the
(that is, subcontractors and sub-subcontractors)?
United Structures of America ("United Structures") supplied
steel to one of G.R.G.'s subcontractor^.^^ After failing to pay
United Structures in full, the subcontractor went bankruptO5'
United Structures then brought suit against G.R.G. to recover
approximately $282,000 allegedly still due under the contract~.~~
G.R.G. countered that the supplied steel was defective, and
t h a t it was therefore entitled to a set-off i n the amount of
$196,509 on the monies owed.53The district court cited Avanti
for the proposition that "a set-off defense is not available in a
Miller Act claim in the absence of p r i ~ i t y , "thus
~ ~ denying
G.R.G. relief on its defective steel claim.55 On appeal, however, the First Circuit took exception to Auanti, holding that
G.R.G. was attempting to assert a right of "recoupment" rather

46. Id.
47. Id. at 997.
48. Id. (citing the Miller Act, 40 U.S.C. $ 270a(a)(2)).
49. J.W. Bateson Co. v. Board of Trustees of the Natl Automatic Sprinkler
Indus. Pension Fund, 434 U.S. 586, 593 (1978).
50. United Structures, 9 F.3d a t 997.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. G.R.G. also alleged that it owed nothing to United Structures because
"United [Structures] engaged in a fraudulent billing practice known as 'front
loading'." Id. The First Circuit Court of Appeals ruled against G.R.G., finding no
genuine or material issues of fact in dispute as to that claim. Id. a t 1000.
54. United States v. Avanti Constructors, Inc., 750 F.2d 759, 762 (9th Cir.
1984).
55. United Structures, 9 F.3d a t 997 (citing Avanti, 750 F.2d at 762).
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than one of set-off under the contract.56This distinction, the
court held, made any determination of privity i r r e l e ~ a n t . ~ ~

B. The First Circuit's Reasoning
In allowing G.R.G. to assert a recoupment defense, the
First Circuit drew a distinction between the doctrines of recoupment and set-~ff.~'
It held that a set-off is a counterclaim
which arises out of an unrelated transaction, while recoupment
is a reduction by a defendant of a plaintiff's claim because of a
right arising out of the same t r a n s a ~ t i o n .The
~ ~ court cited
Black's Law Dictionary to distinguish the two ideas:
If Smith sues Jones for $10,000 for grain that Smith supplied,
and Jones seeks t o reduce the judgment by $5,000 representing Smith's (unrelated) unpaid rental of Jones' summer cottage, Jones is seeking a setoff. "Recoupment," on the other
hand, is "a reduction or rebate by the defendant of part of the
plaintiff's claim because of a right in the defendant arising
out of the same transaction." If Smith sues Jones for $10,000
for grain that Smith supplied, and Jones seeks to reduce the
judgment by $5,000 representing Jones' expenditure to dry
out Smith's (defectively) wet grain (or the cost of the grain's
lost value), Jones is seeking a r e ~ o u ~ m e n t . ~ ~

Although the court admitted that the distinction is "somewhat
te~hnical,"~'
it noted that it remains alive in a few specialized
circumstances, one of which is the realm of bankr~ptcy.~'
The First Circuit gave two reasons for allowing G.R.G. the
benefit of the distinction under the Miller
It first interpreted the language of the Act to allow "a supplier to recover,

56. Id. at 998-99.
57. Id. a t 999-1000.
58. Id. at 998.
59. Id.
60. Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted) (quoting BLACK'SU W DICTIONARY
1230 (5th ed. 1979)).
61. Id.
62. Id.; see, e-g., Lee v. Schweiker, 739 F.2d 870, 875 (3d Cir. 1984); Sapir v.
Blue CrossA3lue Shield (In la Yonkers Hamilton Sanitarium, Inc.), 34 B.R. 385,
386-87 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); United States v. Midwest Serv. and Supply Co. (In re Midwest Serv. and Supply Co.), 44 B.R. 262, 265 (D.Utah 1983); Waldschmidt v.
C.B.S., Inc., 14 B.R. 309, 314 (M.D. Tenn. 1981); Hagan v. Heckler (In re Hagan),
4 1 B.R. 122, 125 n.5 (Bankr. D.R.I. 1984). However, i t has by all means not been
limited to bankruptcy cases. See Rothensies v. Electric Storage Battery Co., 329
U.S. 296, 299 (1946) (federal income tax dispute).
63. United Structures, 9 F.3d a t 999-1000.
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not the full contract price, but the 'sums justly due him."'64
The court then reasoned that recoupment, as a mechanism for
'"do[ing] justice in view of the one transaction as a whole,'
would seem to match the statute's requirement[^]."^^ Further,
it held that "we do not see how the full contract price of goods
supplied can possibly be 'justly due' a person who supplied
defective goods.'""
The second reason the court gave for allowing the recoupment defense stems from "the policies underlying the Miller
Act."" Although the Supreme Court has regularly held that
the purpose of the Miller Act is t o '"protect those whose labor
or material has contributed t o the prosecution of the
the First Circuit decided not t o extend this protection t o "include payments to which the supplier's underlying contract
does not entitle him."" The court pointed to the fact that
those who are in privity with a general contractor (such as a
subcontractor) may be subject to a reduction for "defective articles or work."70Because the "defective articles or work" may
have been supplied by one not in privity with the general contractor (such as a supplier t o the subcontractor)," the court
reasoned that those who are not in privity with the general
contractor (e.g., the sub-subcontractors and suppliers to the
subcontractors) should be held to the same ~tandard.~'In
sum, the First Circuit felt that "disallowing recoupment would
give the supplier 'rights' to which his contract does not entitle
him."73

64. Id. at 999 (emphasis added) (quoting the Miller Act, 40 U.S.C. 9 270b(a)).
65. Id. (citation omitted) (quoting Rothensies, 329 U.S. a t 299).
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Clifford F. MacEvoy Co. v. United States ex rel. Calvin Tomkins Co., 322
U.S. 102, 104 (1944) (quoting United States ex rd. Hill v. American Sur. Co., 200
U.S. 197, 204 (1906) (construing the Heard Act)); see also J.W. Bateson Co. v.
United States ex rd. Bd. of Trustees, 434 U.S. 586, 596 n.2 (1978) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting); F.D. Rich Co. v. Indus. Lumber Co., 417 U.S. 116, 124 (1974).
69. United Structures, 9 F.3d a t 999.
70. Id. (quoting 8 JOHN C. MCBRIDE& THOMASJ. TOUHEY,GOVERNMENT
CONTRACTS
9 49.490[4], a t 49-658 (1993)).
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 1000.

6971

THE MILLER ACT

705

IV. ANALYSIS
The result reached by the First Circuit in United Structures represents a clash of two general governmental policies:
that of the courts in attempting to expeditiously consolidate
causes of action,74 and that of Congress in attempting to protect those that supply labor and materials on federal proj e c t ~ . ?This
~ note will examine these policies in order to determine first whether recoupment is proper in the absence of
contractual privity, and second whether the First Circuit's
reasoning in United Structures can be defended in light of the
stated purposes and highly remedial nature of the Miller Act.
Finally this note will examine the traditionally low burden of
proof placed on those who supply labor and materials and how
that burden relates to the result the First Circuit reached i n
United Structures.

A. Recoupment is Improper in the Absence of Privity
The First Circuit was concerned primarily with the payment bond portion of the Miller Act as a method by which a
supplier could collect "sums justly due him."76 In reasoning
that "disallowing recoupment would . . . give the supplier
'rights' to which his contract does not entitle him,"77the United Structures court mentioned that it did not "understand why
the existence or nonexistence of privity of contract should make
any difference with regard to [the] general policies [of the Mille r Ac~]."'~However, privity has nothing to do with giving the
supplier supplementary rights in a contract-the more sensible
question is whether recoupment is proper in the absence of
privity i n a Miller Act dispute.
As mentioned above, recoupment is a defense based upon a
debt arising out of the same transaction while set-off does not
necessarily involve a claim arising out of the same transaction
or ~ontract.~'
In United Structures, the court assumed that it

74. Montecatini Edison, S.P.A. v. Ziegler, 486 F.2d 1279, 1282 (D.C.Cir.
1973).
75. H.R. REP. NO. 1263, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., at 1 (1935); S. REP. NO. 1238,
74th Cong., 1st Sess., at 1 (1935).
76. United Structures, 9 F.3d at 999 (quoting 40 U.S.C. 4 270b(a)).
77. Id. at 1000.
78. Id. at 999.
79. Lee v. Schweiker, 739 F.2d 870, 875 (1984); 80 C.J.S. Set-Off and Counterclaim $5 34 & 35 (1953); see supra notes 58-62 and accompanying text.
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was dealing with a single transa~tion.'~In fact, there were
several. United Structures supplied its steel t o a subcontractor." The subcontractor in turn used the steel in G.R.G.'s proj e ~ t . ' When
~
United Structures was not paid, it brought suit
against G.R.G. under the provisions of the Miller Act.83
Thus, the situation looked less like the example borrowed
from Black's Law Dictionary by the United Structures courts4
and more like the following: Smith supplies grain to Beck who
makes it into bread. The bread is in turn sold to Jones. Smith
sues Jones for $10,000 for grain that Smith supplied to Beck
under a n exclusive statutory remedy created expressly for the
protection of people in Smith's position. Jones seeks to reduce
the judgment by $5,000 representing Jones' loss from the allegedly defective grain. In this example there was not one transaction, but several. Recall that recoupment is a defense arising
out of the same transaction that gave rise to the initial claim.
The United Structures situation appears to involve multiple transactions despite a liberal definition of the term "transaction" by the
In the realm of counterclaims, the Supreme Court holds that "'[t]ransaction' is a word of flexible
meaning" which "may comprehend a series of many occurrences, depending not so much upon the immediateness of their
connection as upon their logical relation~hip."~~
The theory
behind this holding is judicial e~pediency.'~
Other courts have
followed the Supreme Court's lead in interpreting "transaction"
br~adly:~'
"This concept . . . is not affected by the fact that the

80. See IJnited St~uctures,9 F.3d at 998-1000.
81. Id. a t 997.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
85. See Moore v. New York Cotton Exch., 270 U.S. 593, 609 (1926).
86. Id. a t 610. The United Structures court followed the Avanti court in
characterizing the attempted set-off by G.R.G. as a defense. However, the Supreme
Court notes: "'[Ilt is not clear whether set-offs and recoupments should be viewed
as defenses or counterclaims . . . .'" Reiter v. Cooper, 113 S. Ct. 1213, 1217 (1993)
(quoting 5 CHARLESA. WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER,FEDERALPRACTICEAND
PROCEDURE
$ 1275 (2d ed. 1990)).
87. See, e.g., Columbia Plaza Corp. v. Security Nat'l Bank, 525 F.2d 620, 625
(D.C. Cir. 1975) ("[Tlhe term 'transaction' is to be construed generously to avoid
the unnecessary expense inherent in multiplicious litigation.") (footnote omitted).
88. May v. Parker-Abbott Transfer and Storage, Inc., 899 F.2d 1007, 1009-10
(10th Cir. 1990) (dealing with claim preclusion and noting that a "'contract' is
generally considered to be a 'transaction,'"); Columbia Plaza Corp. 525 F.2d a t 625;
FSLIC v. Burdette, 696 F. Supp. 1183, 1187 (E.D.Tern. 1988).

THE MILLER ACT
case happens to fall under the Miller Act."89 The question remains, however, whether the once-removed relationship between G.R.G. and United Structures should be viewed in this
broad manner.
Several factors mitigate against concluding G.R.G.'s recoupment arose out of a single transaction. First, the Supreme
Court's liberal interpretation of the word has generally been
applied to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 13(a), which deals
with compulsory counter~lairns.~~
Recoupment is a n equitable
doctrineg1 and should be applied in a manner which would
reinforce the broad remedial policies of the statutory scheme
under which relief is
For example, recoupment is
held inapplicable when it clashes with a legislatively enacted
statute of limitation^.^^ Likewise, it was improper for the
First Circuit to apply recoupment against United Structures
when the legislature specifically enacted the payment bond
provisions of the Miller Act to protect those in United
Structure's p~sition.'~
Second, "transaction" is not always defined quite as broadly as first mentioned." Many courts which recognize recoupment require that the amounts sought to be recouped arise out
of the same "contract" rather than " t r a n s a c t i ~ n . "In
~ ~fact, just
89. United States ex re,!. Cent. Rigging & Contracting Corp. v. Paul Tishman
Co., 32 F.R.D. 223, 225 (E.D.N.Y. 1963) (citations omitted) (dealing with whether a
"[c]ourt has ancillary jurisdiction over a counterclaim or cross-claim arising out of
the same transactionn).
90. Southern Constr. Co. v. Pickard, 371 U.S. 57, 60 (1962).
91. Ashland Petroleum Co. v. Appel (In re B&L Oil Co.), 782 F.2d 155, 159
(10th Cir. 1986) (bankruptcy case).
92. I t must be noted, however, that the equitable nature of recoupment cuts
both ways. An equally compelling argument is raised by the United Structures
court: "[D]isallowing recoupment would . . . give the supplier 'rights' to which his
contract does not entitle him." United Structures of America v. G.R.G. Eng'g, S.E.,
9 F.3d 996, 1000 (1st Cir. 1993).
93. "If there are to be exceptions to the statute of limitations, it is for Congress rather than for the courts to create and limit them." Rothensies v. Electric
Storage Battery Co., 329 U.S. 296, 303 (1946) (declining to apply recoupment in
the realm of tax law); see id. (stating "[tlhat claims dead so long can be resurrected under [recoupment], is enough to show its menace to the statute of limitations"); id. a t 302, (noting that "if we should approve a doctrine of recoupment of
the breadth here applied we would seriously undermine the statute of limitations").
94. In a similar situation, the court in Manchester Premium Budget Corp. v.
Manchester Ins. & Indem. Co., 612 F.2d 389, 392 (8th Cir. 1980) (applying Ohio
law), held that "mutuality of parties [is] 'an essential condition of a valid set-off or
counterclaim. That is, the debts must be to and from the same persons and in the
same capacity.' "
95. See supra notes 85-87 and accompanying text.
96. Davidovich v. Welton (In re Davidovich), 901 F.2d 1533, 1538 (10th Cir.
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because "'the same two parties are involved [in the claims to be
offset], and that a similar subject matter gave rise to both
claims . . . does not mean that the two arose from the 'same
transaction' for purposes of the doctrine of rec~upment."~
Further, "courts have generally only found this 'same
transaction' requirement to be satisfied when the debts to be
offset arise out of a single, integrated contract or similar transaction."98 If we use a single contract analysis, then clearly recoupment was improper in United structure^.^^ The relationship between United Structures and G.R.G. was once removed.
United Structures contracted only with the subcontractor,
which in turn contracted with G.R.G.loOBecause contractual
privity was lacking in United Structures, there was not a single
transa~tion.'~'Recoupment was therefore improperly applied.
Further, in Avanti, the Ninth Circuit was correct in noting
that the prime contractor "[is] in the best position to protect
1990) (per curiam); see also Ashland Petroleum Co. v. Appel (In re B&L Oil Co.),
782 F.2d 155, 158 (10th Cir. 1986) (assertion by the creditor that "claims arising
from a single contract generally qualify for recoupment"); Lee v. Schweiker, 739
F.2d 870, 875 (3d Cir. 1984) ("In bankruptcy, the recoupment doctrine has been
applied primarily where the debtor's claims against the creditor arise out of the
same contract.") (citations omitted).
But see Bull v. United States, 295 U.S. 247, 262 (1934) ("[Rlecoupment is in
the nature of a defense arising out of some feature of the transaction upon which
the plaintiff's action is grounded."); Holford v. Powers, 896 F.2d 176, 178 (5th Cir.
1990); In re Monongahela Rye Liquors, 141 F.2d 864, 869 (3d Cir. 1944); Sapir v.
Blue Cross/Blue Shield (In re Yonkers Hamilton Sanitarium), 34 B.R. 385, 386
(S.D.N.Y. 1983); United States v. Midwest Serv. and Supply Co. (In re Midwest
Serv. and Supply Co.), 44 B.R. 262, 265-66 (D. Utah 1983); Waldschmidt v. C.B.S.,
Inc., 14 B.R. 309, 314 (M.D. Tenn. 1981); Hagan v. Heckler (In re Hagan), 41 B.R.
34
122, 125-26 n.5 (Bankr. D.R.I. 1984); 80 C.J.S. Set-off and Counterclaim
(1953) ("In recoupment defendant's claim must arise out of the same contract or
transaction as that on which plaintiff's cause of action is founded.").
97. I n re Davidovich, 901 F.2d 1533, 1538 (.loth Cir. 1990) (per curiam)
(quoting Lee v. Schweiker, 739 F.2d 870, 875 (3d Cir. 1984)); see also FDIC v.
Howse, 802 F. Supp 1554, 1563 (S.D. Tex. 1992) (citing In re Davidouich, 901 F.2d
a t 1538).
98. I n re Dauidovich, 901 F.2d at 1538 (citations omitted); see also Rothensies
v. Electric Storage Battery Co., 329 U.S. 296, 301 (1946) (in the realm of tax law,
criticizing a lower court that "saw no reason for narrowly construing the requirement [of recoupment] that both claims originate in the same transaction," and
opining that "this [analysis] misapprehends the limitations on the doctrine of recoupment").
99. I n the Davidovich case, recoupment was held inapplicable where the obligations of the parties "did not arise out of the same contract, [and were] not limited to the same parties . . . ." 901 F.2d a t 1538.
100. United Structures of America v. G.R.G. Eng'g, S.E., 9 F.3d 996, 997 (1st
Cir. 1993).
101. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
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itself against [the subcontractor's] potential b a n k r ~ p t c y . " ' ~ ~
When examined objectively, it is really the subcontractor that
supplied the steel to the general contractor (G.R.G.). I t is only
through the Miller Act that the general contractor and the subsubcontractor (United structures) have any relationship.
Among other things, the relationship was created for the benefit of the sub-subcontra~tor.'~~
Allowing G.R.G. to also benefit
from that relationship is contrary to legislative intent.
Finally, in both Avanti and United Structures, the general
contractor was attempting to set-off or recoup sums due a subsubcontra~tor.'~~
These situations are analogous. If, as a general proposition, privity is required for a set-off,lo5it should
be doubly required for the more restrictive defense of recoupment.lo6 If the First Circuit wished to disagree with the
Avanti court on this point it should have done so. Instead, it
found its way around that decision, further complicating this
area of law.lo7
In sum, despite the First Circuit's arguments to the contrary,lo8contractual privity matters very much in a defense of
recoupment. To be a part of the same transaction, the party
attempting to assert a defense of recoupment cannot, in the
absence of privity, base that defense on the Miller Act1'' Although these arguments may seem like splitting hairs, the
remedial nature of the Miller Act mandates that they be split
in favor of those it was enacted to protect.

102. United States ex rel. Martin Steel Constructors, Inc. v. Avanti Constructors, Inc., 750 F.2d 759, 763 (9th Cir. 1984).
103. H.R. REP. NO. 1263, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., at 1 (1935); S. REP. NO. 1238,
74th Cong., 1st Sess., at 2 (1935).
104. See United Structures of America v. G.R.G. Eng'g, S.E., 9 F.3d 996, 997
(1st Cir. 1993); United States PX rel. Martin Steel Constructors, Inc. v. Avanti Steel
Constructors, Inc., 750 F.2d 759, 762 (9th Cir. 1984).
105. Avanti, 750 F.2d at 762.
106. See generally 80 C.J.S. Set-off and Counterclaim $9 34 & 35 (1953) (same
transaction required for recoupment but not for set-off).
107. United Structures, 9 F.3d at 1000 (allowing recoupment in the absence of
privity, but not specifically ruling on set-off).
108. Id. at 1000-01.
109. For a contrary view, see United States ex rel. Kashulines v. Thermo Contrading Corp., 437 F. Supp. 195, 199-200 (D.N.J. 1976), arguing that permissive
counterclaims such as set-off (and possibly recoupment) may be asserted under particular causes of action such as the Miller Act. Even this case, however, did not
rule out the possibility that an exclusive statutory remedy could overcome a
defendant's rights to a permissive counterclaim. Id. at 200 ("[Pllaintiff . . . bears a
heavy burden in seeking to establish that jurisdiction over the permissive counterclaims should not exist . . . . Plaintiff has been unable to carry this burden.").
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B. The Miller Act is Highly Remedial in Nature

When the intent of the Miller Act is viewed with the Supreme Court's liberal interpretation and application of it, along
with the Court's wishes that the Act be applied uniformly, the
flaws in the First Circuit's reasoning are apparent. Despite the
court's gloss over legislative intent, the fact remains that the
Miller Act was designed specifically to protect those in United
Structures' situation.
"The Miller Act . . . is highly remedial in nature. . . . [and]
is entitled to a liberal construction and application in order
properly to effectuate the Congressional intent to protect those
whose labor and materials go into public project^.""^ With
these words, the Supreme Court reiterated the purpose of the
Act under which United Structures sought relief. The First
Circuit disregarded legislative intent and instead resurrected
the doctrine of recoupment"' in order to reach what it apparently believed to be an equitable result. The Act, however, has
a long history of single-minded purpose in protecting those who
supply work and materials on federal jobs.l12
I n MacEvoy v. United States, the Supreme Court reiterated
the intent of the legislature "was to remove the procedural
difficulties found to exist under the earlier measure [the Heard
Act] and thereby make it easier for unpaid creditors to realize
the benefits of the bond."'l3 With this intent in mind, it is obvious that any analysis denying the fruits of the bond from
those it was enacted to protect is untenable. This is not to say
that the general contractor should have no rec~urse."~On
110. Clifford I?. MacEvoy Co. v. United States ex rel. Calvin Tomkins Co., 322
US. 102, 107 (1944) (citations omitted).

111. United Structures, 9 F.3d a t 998 (stating that "the distinctions between

. . . recoupment and set-off are no longer of much importance." (quoting 20 AM.

JUR.2D Counterclaim, Recoupment and Setoff 4 10 (1965))). But see id. a t 1000

('We have examined the legislative history of the Miller Act . . . but we have
found nothing that suggests the conclusion reached in Auanti.").
112. In fact, its history reaches back to the original Heard Act of 1894. See,
e.g., Illinois Surety Co. v. John Davis Co., 244 U.S. 376, 380 (1917) (a sub-subcontractor may sue on the bond despite the subcontractor having already been paid in

full).
113. MacEuoy, 322 U.S. a t 106.
114. In comparison to the laborers and material suppliers who normally
have no lien or claim against the government, usually have no right to
assert a claim against money withheld by the government on the prime
contract, and are not entitled to recover on the performance bond executed by the prime contractor to the federal government on the theory that
they are third-party beneficiaries.
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the contrary, many avenues are open to one in G.R.G.'s position.l15 Recoupment, however, should not be one of them. In
the absence of privity, the First Circuit simply applied the
doctrine improperly.
Another flaw in United Structures is that the Miller Act
should not be subject to technical rules which work to deny the
benefits of the payment bond. The rule is simple: "[Tlhe strict
letter of the Act must yield to its evident spirit and purpose
when this is necessary to give effect to the intent of Congre~s.""~This idea is not new.ll7 Early in this century it
was applied to a Heard Act dispute in Illinois Surety Co. v.
John Davis Co? There the Court found that "[iln every case
which has come before this court, where labor and materials
were actually furnished for and used in part performance of the
work contemplated in the bond, recovery was allo~ed.""~
That case further held that "[t]echnical rules protecting sureties from liability have never been applied in proceedings under
this statute."120
This cuts against the First Circuit's reasoning in two ways.
First, the First Circuit admitted the technical nature of the
recoupment but employed it anyway. "This technical legal terminology [recoupment] does not necessarily reflect ordinary
usage."121 Second, the United Structures court made much of
17 AM. JUR.2D Contractor's B o d $ 150 (1990) (footnotes omitted). Their "only
effective remedy" is the Miller Act payment bond. Id.
115. Perhaps a suit against the subcontractor would have been more proper.
See supra notes 102-104 and accompanying text. On the other hand, under the
United Structures fact pattern, the subcontractor to whom United Structures supplied the steel had gone bankrupt. United Structures of America v. G.R.G. Eng'g,
S.E., 9 F.3d 996, 997 (1st Cir. 1993). This, however, is the price we pay for bankruptcy laws which provide overextended debtors a fresh start. See Kansas State
and Trust Bank v. Vickers (In re Vickers), 577 F.2d 683, 686-87) ("One of the
primary purposes of the Bankruptcy Act is the rehabilitation of an honest debtor
by discharging his debts to afford him a fresh start in his economic life.") (citations
omitted). The Miller Act's broad remedial scheme should not be implicated. See
supra notes 112-14.
116. Glassell-Taylor Co. v. Magnolia Petroleum Co. 153 F.2d 527, 530 (5th Cir.
1946) (citations omitted).
117. See Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 459 (1892)
("It is a familiar rule, that a thing may be within the letter of the statute and yet
not within the statute, because not within its spirit, nor within the intention of its
makers.").
118. 244 U.S. 376, 380 (1917).
119. Id.
120. Id. (footnote omitted).
121. United Structures v. G.R.G. Eng'g, S.E., 9 F.3d 996, 998 (1st Cir. 1993)
("[Olften the technical legal distinction [between set-off and recoupment] does not
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the fact that the Act only allows recovery for "sums 'justly due'
a supplier."'" This is a clear case of allowing the letter of the
law to prevail over its r e a ~ 0 n . lOne
~ ~ can imagine a team of
clerks scrutinizing the statute until finding two words which
seem to back the court's preferred holding. The First Circuit's
opinion is flawed because it fusses over technicalities and ignores legislative intent.
A final policy argument against the holding in United
Structures is the need for consistency in construing the Miller
Act. "[Tlhe Act covers most federal works project^,"'^^ no matter the state or jurisdiction. The Supreme Court extols the virtues of uniformity in this area.125A federal cause of action
demands the uniformity commensurate with its universal application. While the Avanti court had all but settled the questions in this area, the First Circuit unnecessarily muddied the
waters by allowing the recoupment defense. In sum, the general purposes of the Miller Act as defined by both the 74th Congress and the Supreme Court compel a result contrary t o that
reached by the First Circuit in United Structures v. G.R.G.
Engineering. 12"

C. The Good Faith Standard and its Relation to Defenses
Asserted by General Contractors
Even failing the above mentioned arguments, the First
Circuit in United Structures should have recognized the almost
ridiculously low burden of proof to which suppliers caught in
Miller Act disputes have traditionally been held. In order to
recover,
material supplier[s] need only prove four elements:
(1) the materials were supplied in prosecution of the work
provided for in the contract;

matter.").
122. Id. at 999.
123. See Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 461 (1892)
("'The reason of the law . . . should prevail over its letter.'" (quoting United States
v. Kirby, 74 U.S. 482, 487 (1868))).
LAW AND
124. IRVRICHTER & ROY S. MITCHEU, HANDBOOK OF CONSTRUCTION
CLAIMS 209 (1982).
125. F.D. Rich Co. v. United States ex rel. Industrial Lumber Co., 417 U.S.
116, 127 (1974) (disallowing the award of attorneys' fees to supplier suing under
the Miller Act as a matter of uniform application despite probable contrary result
under state law).
126. 9 F.3d 996 (1st Cir. 1993).
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(2) [the supplier] has not been paid;
(3) [the supplier] had a good faith belief that the materials
were intended for the specified work; and
(4) the jurisdictional requisites were met.127

Concerning the third prong of the test, material suppliers need
not show that materials were "incorporated into the contract
Nor do they need to prove "that the materials were
delivered to the j ~ b s i t e . " ' ~
In~ fact, "in order to be covered by
the bond, [materials] need . . . [only t o have been] intended in
good faith, and reasonably believed [to have been] furnished for
[the] purpose" of being used in the federal job.lsO
This points to a good faith standard on the part of materialmen such as United Structures. By analogy, if a supplier
need only show that the materials were furnished in good faith,
then likewise the good faith burden should extend to the quality of the materials. Although beyond the scope of this note,
should the First Circuit's recoupment ideas be adopted, it is
logical that one asserting the defense of recoupment should be
required to prove that the defective materials were not supplied in good faith. This would place the burden of proof on the
general contractor and would standardize claims of those supplying materials on federal projects who have gone unpaid.

It is important t o remember that the Miller Act was treated to protect laborers and materialmen, not general contractors.131 General contractors' claims lie either with those to
which they are in privity or outside of Miller Act disputes altogether. Neither set-off nor recoupment is proper in the absence
of privity. Further, the general contractor is in a position to
protect itself. However, those supplying goods and materials in
federal jobs have no recourse other than that provided by the
Miller Act. The remedial scheme should therefore not be whit127. United States ex rel. Martin Steel Constructors v. Avanti Constructors,
Inc., 750 F.2d 759, 761 (9th Cir. 1984) (citing United States ex re!. Carlson v.
Continental Casualty Co., 414 F.2d 431, 433 (5th Cir. 1959)).
2D Contractor's Bonds $ 159 (1990) (footnote omitted).
128. 17 AM. JIJH.
129. Id.
130. C.C. Marvel, Annotation, What Constitutes Supplying Labor and Material
"in the Prosecution of the Work" Provided for in the Primary Contract Under Miller
Act, 79 A.L.R.~D843, 847 (1961) (citation omitted).
131. Clifford F. MacEvoy Co. v. United States ex rel. Calvin Tomkins Co., 322
U.S. 102, 107 (1944).
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tled away. Also, Congress never intended the First Circuit's
narrow reading. The two words, "justly due," distilled out of
many, cannot overcome the Miller Act's broad remedial nature.
Although the Supreme Court encourages judicial expediency, it
also recognizes the value of the protections afforded by the
Miller Act. Justice requires that equity not rule in favor of
technicalities over fairness. Lastly, the customary interpretation of the Miller Act, and the burden of proof those it protects
have traditionally been held to, scream against any weakening
of its remedial scheme. Although recoupment is a useful tool,
the First Circuit in United Structures simply applied it improperly. Courts would be wise not to follow the First Circuit in its
application of recoupment. Such limitations have no place in
Miller Act payment bond disputes.

Dennis M. Sponer

